UK Local Authority engagement with the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model: key characteristics, benefits, limitations and considerations by Hannon, Matthew & Bolton, Ronan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK Local Authority engagement with the Energy Service
Company (ESCo) model: key characteristics, benefits, limitations
and considerations
Citation for published version:
Hannon, M & Bolton, R 2015, 'UK Local Authority engagement with the Energy Service Company (ESCo)
model: key characteristics, benefits, limitations and considerations' Energy Policy, vol. 78, pp. 198-212.
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.016
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.016
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Energy Policy
Publisher Rights Statement:
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Energy Policy. Changes
resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other
quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work
since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Energy Policy, VOL78,
(March 2015) 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.11.016
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper outlines how some UK Local Authorities (LAs) have opted to engage with 
the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model in a bid to enhance their influence over 
local energy system change and help them to deliver on their political ‘public good’ 
objectives. Three common approaches to LA ESCo model engagement are outlined: 
1) LA owned ‘arms-length’ model; 2) private sector owned concession agreement 
model; and 3) community owned and run model. The LA’s decision to establish its 
own ESCo, or alternatively enter into a partnership with another, predominantly 
depends on: its willingness to expose itself to risk, the level of strategic control it 
desires and the resources it has at its disposal. However, the business case is 
contingent on the extent to which the national policy and regulatory framework 
facilitates and obligates LAs to play an active energy governance role. Stronger 
alignment of local and national energy agendas through communication and 
coordination between different governance actors could help to remove critical 
barriers to LA ESCo engagement and their wider energy governance activities. 
Key words 
• Local Authorities 
• Energy Service Companies (ESCos) 
• Local energy governance 
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1 Introduction  
The challenge of governing wide-scale energy systems change has received growing 
attention in recent years in light of the threats posed by anthropogenic climate 
change, energy security and rising cost of energy (Smith, 2009; Bradshaw, 2010; 
Verbong and Loorbach, 2012), commonly known as the ‘energy trilemma’. Whilst 
national government is typically the central energy governance actor in most 
countries, energy governance unfolds at multiple spatial scales and between a 
range of actors (Smith, 2007a). In this context, a number of scholars have 
highlighted the potentially important role local-level actors such as Local 
Authorities (LAs), businesses and community groups could play in managing the 
transition to a sustainable energy system (Bulkeley et al., 2010; Hodson and Marvin, 
2010; Hawkey et al., 2013; Bolton and Foxon, in press.).  
The UK energy system presents a particularly fascinating case with respect to sub-
national energy governance, not least in terms of the role played by LAs. In the 
early 20th century LAs played an important energy governance role with many 
owning and operating municipal energy companies, however by the mid-20th 
century these powers were transferred to central government following a period of 
nationalisation. Subsequent periods of privatisation and liberalisation shifted power 
again, this time towards a handful of multi-national Energy Utilities, today 
commonly known as the ‘Big Six’. These developments have culminated in a 
centralised, high-carbon energy system, which is predominantly owned and 
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managed by the private sector but overseen by national government through 
energy regulation.  
In recent decades the structure of the UK energy market has offered few 
opportunities for LAs to play a leading energy governance role. However, the recent 
‘opening up’ of the UK energy market under liberalisation, alongside mounting 
concerns around the ‘energy trilemma’, could create new opportunities for LAs to 
once again play an important energy governance role (CCC, 2012; DECC, 2013a). 
This move could also be driven by very low levels of satisfaction amongst customers 
of the ‘Big Six’ over recent years, who scored between 31-45% in 20141 (Which?, 
2014). This situation has presented both customers and entrepreneurs alike with a 
compelling motive to identify more alternative energy solutions, which offer more 
attractive value propositions (Hannon, 2012; Hannon et al., 2013).  
This paper draws upon two in-depth empirical studies conducted by the authors 
(Bolton, 2011; Hannon, 2012), incorporating 52 expert interviews and extensive 
documentary evidence, to examine how and why some LAs have in recent years 
made attempts to play a more active energy governance role in the UK. It focuses 
specifically on their engagement with the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business 
model, which is centred on providing customers with energy services; the physical 
benefit, utility or good people derive from energy (EU, 2006) (e.g. space heating). 
On the basis that the ESCo is being paid to deliver the final energy-related 
                                                     
2 A detailed breakdown of the core characteristics of the ESCo model can be found 
in both Hannon (2012) and Hannon et al. (2013). 
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functionality their customers’ desire, they are intrinsically incentivised to apply 
their expertise to ensure that the conversion process from fuel to energy service is 
achieved as efficiently as possible. This is because it is they who bear the cost of any 
associated inefficiency, not the customer. It is therefore characteristically distinct 
from companies who sell units of energy (e.g. gas, oil), where the customer is 
responsible for converting these into the energy services they desire, in turn 
bearing the costs of inefficient conversion (Hannon et al., 2013)2. Consequently, 
this model has been identified by various scholars as a potential means of fulfilling 
our energy needs in a more sustainable manner than at present (Vine, 2005; 
Fawkes, 2007; Hansen, 2009; Marino et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2012).  
At present the UK is home to a relatively small ESCo market. A recent survey 
identified approximately 30-50 companies (Bertoldi et al., 2014), however only a 
handful of these will be owned by or closely affiliated with LAs. Some existing work 
has already helped to provide some valuable insights into why only a limited 
number of UK LAs have engaged with the ESCo model thus far (Smith, 2007b) or 
energy projects more broadly (DECC, 2013b; Hawkey et al., 2014), alongside some 
potential policy solutions. To complement this work the paper provides a detailed 
examination of: a) the different ways in which LAs have engaged with the ESCo 
business model in the UK; b) the key factors influencing the decision to opt for or 
against these approaches, primarily from the LA’s perspective; and c) some policy 
                                                     
2 A detailed breakdown of the core characteristics of the ESCo model can be found 
in both Hannon (2012) and Hannon et al. (2013). 
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and practical considerations for both local and national government associated with 
employing this local energy governance approach.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the ESCo 
model. Section 3 explores the energy governance role UK LAs have played in past, 
how this is beginning to change and opportunities for additional work in this area. 
Section 4 outlines the paper’s empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the main 
empirical results. Here we outline in detail the different ways in which UK LAs have 
developed and engaged with different ESCo models. Section 6 discusses some 
wider considerations for both LAs and national government in relation to LA 
engagement with the ESCo model. Section 7 presents the paper’s conclusions and 
recommendations for future work. 
2 Introduction to the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model  
This section presents a brief introduction to the ESCo model to provide important 
context for the subsequent sections examining how and why UK LAs have engaged 
with this model.  
An ESCo is an organisation that provides its customers with energy services, which 
relate to the physical benefit, utility or good people derive from energy (EU, 2006). 
These services are provided via long-term energy service contracts, normally lasting 
between 5 to 25 years, which fall into two broad categories; energy performance 
contracts (EPCs) and energy supply contracts (ESCs) (Fawkes, 2007; Sorrell, 2007; 
Hansen, 2009; Hannon, 2012). For the purposes of this paper we focus on ESCs 
considering that UK LAs have typically employed this type of contracting over EPCs 
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(Kelly and Pollitt, 2010; Hannon, 2012), normally as a means of delivering combined 
heat and power (CHP) district heating (DH) schemes. 
EPCs involve the provision of final energy services (e.g. lighting, heating, motive 
power), which constitute energy streams that have been converted by secondary 
conversion equipment (e.g. radiators or fluorescent lighting) and can thus be 
enjoyed directly by customers, without the need for additional conversion 
processes (Sorrell, 2005; Sorrell, 2007). In contrast ESCos offering ESCs provide 
useful energy streams to their customers, such as hot water, coolant and electricity, 
which have already been converted by primary conversion equipment (e.g. a boiler, 
CHP plant etc.) but have not yet undergone secondary conversion. Here the 
customer is usually charged per unit of useful energy (Sorrell, 2007) or a fixed price 
for the supply of a pre-determined level of energy service (Marino et al., 2011). 
Figure 1 illustrates the space within which ESCos supplying ESCs work and how this 
is differentiated from the work of Energy Utilities and ESCos offering EPCs.  
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Figure 1: Typical ‘work space’ of Energy Utilities and ESCos (adapted from Sorrell, 2007) 
During the period of the ESC the ESCo assumes control over the consumer’s primary 
conversion equipment, as well as the distribution infrastructure. The ESCo uses this 
control to maximize the efficiency of the system in order to satisfy its consumer’s 
energy needs at the lowest cost. This cost reduction is mainly achieved by reducing 
demand for delivered energy (i.e. imported fuel or electricity) through technical and 
operational efficiency improvements across both the primary conversion 
equipment and the distribution infrastructure (Sorrell, 2007). For example, many LA 
affiliated ESCos employ CHP generation technology as part of a DH system, which 
involves the simultaneous generation of electricity and heat from either gas or 
biomass sources. This approach can yield a 28% primary energy saving compared to 
traditional centralised forms of energy generation where heat is lost via cooling 
towers (Carbon Trust, 2010). Furthermore, by operating on a district-scale, 
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electricity transmission and distribution losses are reduced because it is generated 
so close to the point of consumption (Carbon Trust, 2010).  
3 The changing energy governance role of UK Local Authorities, past and 
present 
In this section we present an overview of how the energy governance role of LAs in 
the UK has evolved over the 20th and 21st centuries in the context of wider energy 
system changes, specifically referencing their engagement with the ESCo model. 
Following this we discuss how recent developments could open up new 
opportunities for LAs to play a more active energy governance role. Finally, we 
identify some opportunities for further research in this field, thus framing the 
contribution of this paper. 
3.1 Brief history of UK LA energy governance 
LAs have a long history of energy governance in the UK. According to Chesshire 
(1996) local, public electricity supply in the UK can be traced back to the 1880s with 
the establishment of numerous small-scale, municipal electricity companies. 
Simmonds (2002) estimates that following the Second World War approximately 
two thirds of the 560 electricity suppliers operating in the UK were publicly owned, 
many of which operated at the local-level. However, responsibility for energy 
supply was ultimately transferred away from a combination of local government 
and small scale privately owned utilities to national government following 
nationalisation in 1947-48. This resulted in the aggregation of these smaller 
companies into large, state controlled regional and national energy companies. 
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Consequently, ‘for most of the post-war period, the [UK] energy sector was run by 
the state through integrated monopolies’ (Helm, 2003 p.14).  
The formation of the Conservative government in 1979 heralded a period of 
privatization during the 1980s and energy market liberalisation during the 1990s 
(Ekins, 2010; Pearson and Watson, 2012). This period of privatisation and market 
liberalisation led to the emergence of an entirely new constellation of energy actors 
in the UK, which included: private generators; transmission operators (TNOs); 
distribution network operators (DNOs); electricity suppliers and a market regulator 
(Ofgem) (Ekins, 2010; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011). Most notable was the emergence 
of the small number of large, vertically-integrated Energy Utility Companies, known 
as the ‘Big Six’, which grew to dominate both generation and supply markets. 
In contrast to this emergence of a centralised energy system governed principally 
by the UK government and a handful of companies, LAs have made some forays 
into the energy market in recent years, a trend captured by the excellent work 
conducted by Smith (2007b), Hawkey et al. (2013) and Hawkey et al. (2014). The 
latter report found that almost one third (30%) of the UK’s 434 LAs are actively 
planning, and investing in, energy productivity and provision, signalling a healthy 
appetite amongst UK LAs to play an active energy governance role. They note 
however that much of this activity is at the aspirational and planning stage and that 
only 9% of UK authorities are showing evidence of significant numbers of energy 
project investments. Many of these have involved ESCos and incorporated a strong 
environmental, economic and/or social well-being dimension.  
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Not all of these projects have adopted the same approach however. Some LAs have 
established their own ‘arm’s length’ ESCos, such as Enviroenergy (est. 1995) in 
Nottingham, Thameswey Energy (est. 1999) in Woking, and Aberdeen Heat and 
Power (est. 2002) in Aberdeen (Smith, 2007b; Hannon, 2012). Alternatively, some 
other LAs have signed concession agreements with large, private sector ESCos to 
deliver local energy projects via a ‘special purpose vehicle’. Examples include 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets Council and EDF’s partnership through 
Barkantine Heat & Power Company (BHPC) (est. 2000), Birmingham City Council 
and Cofely District Energy’s 3  partnership through Birmingham District Energy 
Company (BDEC) (est. 2006) and Southampton City Council and Cofely District 
Energy’s partnership through Geothermal Heating Company (SGHC) (est. 1986) 
(Smith, 2007b). In some other cases LAs have supported the work of community 
ESCos as in the case of Meadows Ozone Energy Services Limited (MOZES) in 
Nottingham (Hannon, 2012) and Kielder Community Enterprises Ltd in 
Northumberland (Northumberland National Park, 2014).  
On the one hand the UK ESCo market appears to be experiencing balanced growth, 
increasing from approximately 20 companies in 2010 (Marino et al., 2010) to 
between approximately 30-50 in 2014 (Bertoldi et al., 2014) but only a fraction of 
these are closely affiliated with LAs. Additionally, the energy sector is still very 
much dominated by the Big Six Energy Utilities, accounting for approximately 95% 
of domestic energy supply in January 2014 (Ofgem, 2014), with combined Earnings 
                                                     
3 A subsidiary of Cofely GDF Suez 
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before Interest and Tax (EBIT) of approximately $5.9 billion in 2012 (Ofgem, 2014)4. 
In contrast Marino et al. (2010) estimated the total value of existing energy service 
contracts in the UK ESCo market to be worth approximately $530 million per annum 
in 20105.  
Despite the increasing trend towards privatization and liberalisation national 
government retains a central role in UK energy governance. Keirstead and Schulz 
(2010) explain that this can in part be explained by the wide range of tools national 
policy makers have at their disposal, such as direct service provision, setting general 
market conditions, regulating specific product standards and by encouraging 
desired behaviours through information and awareness campaigns. In contrast LAs 
are subject to greater restrictions in terms of energy governance than central 
government such as a lack of available investment capital and limited powers of 
taxation and regulation, meaning they tend to act only in a limited number of areas 
such as planning (subject to central guidance) or energy management within a 
council’s own operations (OECD, 1995; Capello et al., 1999; EU, 2007; Keirstead and 
Schulz, 2010).  
The situation in the UK for LA energy governance is quite different to some other 
countries, where they play a much more active energy governance role (Smith, 
2007b). For instance both Sweden and Germany have a rich heritage of local energy 
                                                     
4 Value have been exchanged and deflated to equal 2012 US dollars. 
5 This value is an estimate and includes both energy performance and energy supply 
contracts. See Section 2 for an explanation of how these differ. 
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planning where LAs have traditionally played a central role in ‘rolling-out’ 
decentralised technologies such as combined heat and power with district heating 
(CHP/DH) (e.g. Göteborg Energi in Sweden) and wind power (e.g. RheinEnergie AG 
Germany). However, some recent and emerging trends could change the energy 
governance role UK LAs play in the future. 
3.2 Recent and emerging trends in UK LA energy governance 
The move towards a more central energy governance role for UK LAs has received 
support from two national-level energy governance actors in particular. The first is 
the Committee on Climate Change (CCC)6, which recently outlined in a recent 
report (CCC, 2012) that ‘Local Authorities are well placed to drive and influence 
emissions reductions in their wider areas through the services they deliver, their 
role as social landlords, trusted community leaders and major employers, and their 
regulatory and strategic functions’ (p.8). Whilst this sphere of influence stretches 
across key areas such as transport and waste, their influence is considered to be 
greatest in relation to the energy sector. The second is the Department of Energy 
Climate Change (DECC), who underlined as part of its recent Heat Strategy (DECC, 
2013a) that ‘Local Authorities are critical players in increasing the deployment of 
heat networks as they can create a supportive environment for the development of 
heat networks in their areas and support or sponsor specific projects’ (p.50). 
                                                     
6 The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) is a national body responsible for 
advising government on achieving its emissions reductions targets 
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This vein of political support has to some extent been translated into energy 
regulation designed to foster a more prominent governance role for LAs. For 
example, the Local Government Acts 2000 and 2003, and the Localism Act 2011, 
have provided LAs with the ‘power of well-being’, thus increasing their level of 
political autonomy not just over energy issues. These allow LAs in England and 
Wales to implement any policy they believe will promote the economic, social and 
environmental well-being of their area, unless explicitly prohibited by national 
legislation (CLG, 2009). In terms of energy governance specifically, central 
government repealed a clause in the 1976 Local Government Act in 2010 that had 
previously prohibited LAs ‘from selling electricity which is produced otherwise than 
in association with heat [e.g. CHP]’ (DECC, 2010 p.4).  
Despite this apparent drive from central government to devolve energy governance 
power to LAs, the CCC (2012) highlights a number of ways in which UK government 
policy has undermined the prospects for LA energy governance. These include the:  
• abolition of the Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and Local Authority National 
Indicators that required LAs to implement targets in relation to carbon 
emissions and fuel poverty, and report on their progress (CCC, 2012).  
• disbanding of the Regional Development Agencies, who had a statutory role 
in contributing to sustainable development. Replaced by Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) who may seek to achieve similar objectives but on a 
voluntary and predominantly self-funded basis. 
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• reduction in revenue funding from Government to Local Authorities, 
amounting to a 26% fall in real terms between 2010-11 and 2014-15. 
The prospects for local energy governance have also been undermined by central 
government’s reiterated desire to maintain a predominantly centralised energy 
strategy through its Electricity Market Reform (EMR), as incorporated in the Energy 
Act 2013. It is designed to facilitate large-scale investment in centralised electricity 
generation, such as nuclear energy, potentially at the expense of more innovative, 
system orientated energy solutions (Mitchell et al., 2011; Bolton and Hawkes, 
2013).  
In summary, whilst central government has moved to broaden the powers of LAs to 
play a more active energy governance role they have simultaneously introduced 
policies that reinforces the traditional centralised energy governance paradigm. 
Consequently, there is a need for further research in this area to provide insights 
into the characteristics, benefits and challenges of LA ESCo engagement to inform 
the design of future UK energy policy. 
3.3 Opportunities for further work 
Some valuable research has already examined these issues, most notably the work 
undertaken by Smith (2007b), DECC (2013b) and Hawkey et al. (2014) work. Smith’s 
work presents a detailed overview of LA engagement with the ESCo model, the 
report is not based on an explicit empirical methodology, drawing more on 
experiential data. Also, the report does not explicitly present recommendations for 
supporting LA ESCo adoption, instead providing more of a ‘snapshot’ of drivers and 
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barriers at that time. Additionally, the report was prepared by a law firm and 
focuses predominantly on regulatory and legal issues at the expense of other types 
of drivers (e.g. infrastructure, user practices etc.). Finally, the report was published 
several years ago and the energy policy landscape has changed dramatically since 
then, meaning some of the findings are now out-of-date. In contrast DECC’s and 
Hawkey at al.’s work represents a much needed systematic overview of LA energy 
engagement in the UK but does not deal explicitly with the characteristics, 
advantages and limitations of the different approaches to ESCo engagement, 
instead looking more broadly at LA engagement with energy projects, 
predominantly district heating.  
In this context this paper aims to make a valuable contribution to the literature by 
presenting an up-to-date, detailed empirical investigation of how and why LAs have 
engaged specifically with the ESCo model (Section 5), to uncover the value and 
opportunities associated with this approach. In the following section we outline the 
methodology that is employed as part of the paper’s empirical investigation. 
4 Methodology  
The results outlined in Section 5 relating to LA engagement with the ESCo model are 
drawn from the authors’ PhD theses, namely Bolton (2011) and Hannon (2012). The 
scope of the investigation is limited to LA engagement with the ESCo model in the UK, 
focusing on both LA owned and run ESCos or LA partnerships with existing private 
sector or community ESCo. It also deals with just energy supply contracting and not 
energy performance contracting (see Section 2). 
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In total the authors conducted 53 semi-structured stakeholder interviews7 between 
June 2010 and February 2012, each lasting approximately 1 hour long. Bolton 
conducted 17 interviews with LA personnel, as well as consultants, national policy 
makers and energy companies involved in the development of district heating 
networks. These interviews focused mainly on the wider energy (heat and 
electricity) policy and regulatory context influencing the development of 
sustainable energy distribution networks at the regional and local level in the UK. 
We draw on these interviews mainly for contextual and background information to 
help inform our discussion in Section 6.  
Hannon’s study involved a more specific examination of the different types of ESCos 
which LAs are engaging with and is the source material for the main empirical 
section of the paper (Section 5). This study began with an extensive review of 
academic, governmental, industrial and third sector literature on energy service 
provision and UK ESCo activity. This identified three main LA types of ESCo 
engagement, which were investigated in further detail via 36 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with experts who possessed extensive experience of LA 
affiliated ESCo management and/or working alongside such ESCos, either in an 
operational (e.g. provision of financial, technical or legal expertise) or strategic 
capacity (e.g. design of ESCo related policy). Interviewees were invited to talk about 
                                                     
7 A full list of interviewees is contained in Appendix A. Whilst the authors conducted 
a larger number of interviews that is listed in the appendix only those with direct 
relevance to the research questions posed in this paper are referenced. 
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the different ways in which LAs have engaged with the ESCo business model in the 
UK, as well as the rationale behind adopting these approaches from different 
perspectives and the wider issues relating to this local energy governance 
approach. The main empirical section of the paper draws various quotes from 
Hannon’s study due to its specific focus on ESCos. 
Instead of focusing exclusively on one or two case studies, the paper employs a more 
sector-level approach of LA ESCo engagement. A variety of individual LA ESCo cases 
are presented in Section 5 to illustrate the features and challenges facing each ESCo 
type, drawing upon a wide range of interviewees. These interviews were firstly 
transcribed by the respective authors before being analysed. This involved the 
authors categorising interviewees’ responses manually into thematic categories to 
help ‘make sense’ of the data and identify emerging themes. This process was 
undertaken using transcription coding software, such as NVivo 8.  
The ESCo study adopted a ‘purposive sampling’ strategy where, based on the initial 
document review, individuals were invited for interview who were identified as 
possessing a strong understanding of ESCo operation and/or working alongside 
ESCos, either in an operational (e.g. provision of financial, technical or legal 
expertise) or strategic capacity (e.g. design of ESCo related policy). Subsequently a 
‘snowball sampling’ strategy was employed, whereby interviewees gave names of 
further appropriate interviewees (Black, 1999). On the basis of this a wide variety of 
energy service market stakeholders in the UK were invited for interview, 
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representing a wide variety of professional backgrounds and expertise (Appendix 
A).  
Given the relatively small size of the interviewee sample compared to the number 
of UK ESCo sector employees, it is inappropriate to draw generalizations from the 
outputs of this study. Instead, the empirical investigation constitutes a qualitative 
exploratory study, intended to provide valuable insights into the types of 
characteristics, benefits and challenges associated with LA ESCo engagement. The 
interviews are used to illustrate common themes that emerged from the 
interviewees’ respondents and triangulated with publically available reports where 
possible to provide further underpinning evidence. Given these methodological 
limitations we present a number of recommendations in Section 7 for future work 
that could complement and expand upon the research presented in this paper. 
5 UK Local Authority approaches to ESCo model engagement 
In this section we draw upon empirical evidence to explore how and why LAs have 
engaged with some of these different ESCo models in an effort to govern local 
energy system change. We examine the ESCo variants in the following order: 1) LA 
owned ‘arms-length’ model; 2) private sector owned concession arrangement 
model; and 3) community owned and run model. For each variant we present the 
key characteristics of these arrangements, alongside the factors that have either 
encouraged or discouraged LAs from choosing to adopt these approaches over 
others. At the end of each sub-section we present a table summarising these points 
for each of these variants.  
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5.1 Local Authorities and the Local Authority owned ‘arms-length’ ESCo model 
5.1.1 Overview of arrangement 
An LA ‘arm’s length’ ESCo is a separate legal entity from the LA but which is typically 
wholly owned by it and exists to fulfil strategic objectives that are in line with the 
council’s wider political objectives. These are often established as companies either 
limited by shares or by guarantee that operate a ‘non-for-profit’ model whereby 
any profits generated are recycled back into the running of the company, rather 
than distributed to shareholders or investors. In the UK these types of companies 
have tended to supply heat, electricity and to a lesser extent cooling via CHP/DH 
schemes. Notable examples in the UK include Aberdeen Heat & Power, 
Enviroenergy in Nottingham and Thameswey Energy Limited (TEL) in Woking.  
These types of ESCos tend to operate exclusively within the LA’s borough and thus 
at a relatively small scale. However, it is possible for them to operate outside the 
LA’s borough as evidenced by TEL who recently expanded their operations beyond 
Woking and into Milton Keynes (approximately 65 miles away). Additionally, these 
ESCos are typically owned and operated exclusively by the LA but in some instances 
they might be established as a joint-venture and be part-owned by a private sector 
partner. For instance, ownership of TEL in Woking was initially split between 
Woking Borough Council (81%) and Xergi (19%), a CHP specialist but has since 
become entirely owned by Woking council (Smith, 2007b). 
Figure 2 outlines the main actor partnerships and resource flows in this type of LA 
ESCo arrangement.  
20 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Local Authority ‘arms’ length’ ESCo (Hannon, 2012) 
 
5.1.2 Factors influencing LA decision to engage with this model 
The Managing Director of one LA ESCo explained that the key reason behind an LA 
establishing its own ESCo is that it can ‘provide public benefit through private sector 
mechanisms’ (Interview 4), thus constituting a private sector vehicle that help the 
LA deliver on its political objectives (e.g. reduce fuel poverty, mitigate climate 
change, improve local economy etc.). Proponents of this ESCo model that were 
interviewed cited the fact that the council owns and manages the ESCo, offering the 
LA a significant degree of control over the types of energy projects that will be 
delivered in the local area, and potentially affording it greater control over how it 
can fulfil its objectives (Interviews 4, 15 & 48). This was highlighted by the head of 
sustainable development at one LA: 
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‘Rather than a simple contractual relationship [with a private sector ESCo], it 
gives us more leverage in terms of achieving other objectives and outcomes’ 
(Interview 15) 
A number of interviewees (Interviews 2, 4, 7, 15, 40 & 48) highlighted that a key 
strength of this approach is that the ESCo operates a ‘not-for-profit’ financial model, 
which one central government energy policy advisor explained involved profits being 
‘recycled back into the system to either upgrade a project or help it deliver others’ 
(Interview 44). In cases such as TEL in Woking, the LA has benefited from the payment 
of interest on loans made to its ESCo, which amount to approximately £1 million per 
annum (Interviews 2, 4 & 7). This revenue stream is fed into the sum total of funds 
available to the LA to support its activities, helping the council to deliver projects it 
might have otherwise not had the funding for. Research by the New Economics 
Foundation argues that because these profits are reinvested into projects in the local 
area, they also contribute to the multiplier effect, where each pound spent locally 
stimulates considerably more local economic growth than if it were spent elsewhere 
(New Economics Foundation, 2005). An energy ‘think tank’ specialist discussed how 
local ESCo projects can contribute to this effect: 
‘Profits from the energy system are retained, shared, distributed and used 
locally [so] you can probably see a measurable increase in the local economy 
as a result of that. Because if your profits are going to New York and Paris 
[they’re not] being spent locally’ (Interview 40) 
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Because the ESCo is owned by the LA, but is also a separate private sector entity, it 
is able to raise finance from both private and public sectors to fund its energy 
projects. A number of interviewees highlighted how this arrangement opens up 
greater opportunities to secure the necessary finance to deliver low carbon projects 
(Interviews 1, 3 & 4). For example, TEL has been able to raise money from private 
sector financiers such as Lombard North Central Plc. (TEL, 2013), whilst at the same 
time loaning money through Woking Borough Council who have sourced this from 
the Public Loan Works Board, which lends money from the National Loans Fund to 
LAs and other public bodies.  
A number of the interviewees (Interviews 3, 47 & 48), as well as a book chapter 
written by the executive director of TEL in Woking (Thorp, 2011), highlighted that 
an important benefit of establishing the ESCo as a separate legal entity is that it 
possesses greater freedoms that if it were attached to the LA. For example, in the 
TEL case the ESCo manages its budgets autonomously and is therefore less 
vulnerable to cutbacks in public expenditure than the LA. Similarly, it is less 
vulnerable to changes in ‘political mood’ that might interrupt its activities if it were 
part of the LA. For instance, the Managing Director of one LA ESCo explained that 
these ESCos can ‘have business plans that are 25-30 years long’ and are therefore 
‘able to take losses in years going forward, which the council couldn’t carry on its 
books’ (Interview 4). This means that the LA can develop energy projects with a 
longer term perspective than would have otherwise been possible because 
‘business plans transcend the democratic cycle’ (Interview 4), which typically only 
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last for 12 months when the local elections take place. The LA may also take credit 
for any successful projects delivered by its ESCo, which could afford it greater levels 
of legitimacy with respect to energy governance. This could mean that other energy 
actors (e.g. consumers, investors etc.) are more willing to accept the LA’s decisions 
on key energy issues. However, this can work both ways and if the LA’s ESCo 
projects are unsuccessful then this will damage its public image and potentially its 
finances. Importantly, the LA can enjoy these kinds of benefits whilst being 
insulated from much of the associated financial risk associated with delivering 
energy service contracts. As the Head of Sustainable Development at one LA 
explained, because the ESCo constitutes ‘a separate legal entity, if its business 
failed, then it would be that which failed, not the [Local Authority]’ (Interview 15).  
Despite being insulated from some of the direct risks associated with business 
failure by employing this approach (e.g. insolvency), the LA is still exposed to a 
variety of financial, technical and political risks: financial in relation to the 
repayment of loans the LA may have made to the ESCos, technical in that the LA 
often relies upon its ESCo to satisfy its own energy needs, and political on the basis 
that if the ESCo is deemed a failure by the local electorate that they may lose votes 
in forthcoming elections. These risks are noted by a legal expert in the area:  
‘You take a lot of risk…If it all goes wrong, there is no private sector provider 
to turn round and say ‘you have messed this up, we will get rid of you and 
replace you with somebody new’ (Interview 48) 
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One LA ESCo manager explained that due to these risks many LAs choose not to 
establish an ‘arm’s length’ ESCo because they are typically ‘very conservative…very 
risk adverse [and] not necessarily that keen on innovation’ (Interview 3). 
Additionally, LAs are not typically incentivised by regulation to deliver energy 
projects, such as the absence of city-level GHG emissions reduction targets or Local 
Authority National Indicators for tackling carbon emissions and fuel poverty. 
Therefore, many LAs believe sustainable energy initiatives sit outside their remit. 
Even if the LA is willing to deliver such projects through its own ESCo it may lack the 
necessary financial and technical resources to establish and operate an ESCo. 
However, ‘political will’ was considered to be the most important criterion by a 
Chief Executive of one council that had established its own ESCo: 
‘There needs to be the will in place…You can buy the technical and 
administrative capacity but you cannot buy the will to do it…the dream, the 
aspiration to do something. If there is a will, there is a way’ (Interview 17) 
If the LA is risk adverse but still keen to deliver local energy initiatives, it may 
instead opt to establish a joint-venture arrangement with a private sector partner 
(see Section 5.1.1) as a means of spreading the risk associated with the ESCo’s 
project and a way of harnessing the resources to deliver these projects. 
Alternatively, the LA may want to avoid ownership altogether, in which case it 
might opt to sign a concession arrangement with a private-sector ESCo (Section 5.2) 
or support a community-led ESCo (Section 5.3). Before discussing these ESCo 
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models in more depth we summarise the key points discussed in this sub-section 
(Table 1).  
Table 1: Summary of key characteristics, benefits and limitations of the LA owned ‘arm’s length’ ESCo model 
from the LA’s perspective 
Characteristics Rationale for engagement Potential limitations  Examples 
• Wholly owned by the 
LA, unless a joint-
venture with a private 
sector partner  
• ‘Not-for-profit’ 
financial model where 
profits are recycled 
into future LA 
initiatives 
• Operations typically 
limited to the local 
area  
• Activities are 
specifically tailored to 
help LA deliver on its 
political objectives  
• ESCo is a separate 
legal entity thus 
insulating LA from 
majority of risk 
associated with its 
operations 
• Can develop long 
term energy 
strategies 
• Additional revenue 
stream to support its 
operations 
• Finance can be raised 
from public and 
private sectors 
• Successful projects 
provide LA with 
greater legitimacy as 
energy governance 
actor 
• Scope of projects 
normally limited to 
LA’s borough 
• Still exposed to some 
financial and 
technical risk  
• LA may lack 
necessary resources, 
experience, expertise 
and/or political will 
to ‘start up’ and 
operate an ESCo 
• Unsuccessful 
projects could 
undermine the LA’s 
legitimacy on 
managing key energy 
issues 
• Aberdeen Heat & 
Power 
• Enviroenergy 
(Nottingham) 
• Thameswey Energy 
(Woking) 
• Thameswey Central 
Milton Keynes 
5.2 Local Authorities and the private sector owned concession agreement ESCo 
model 
5.2.1 Overview of arrangement 
As an alternative to establishing its own ESCo LAs may contract with an existing 
private sector ESCo, often referred to as an Energy Services Provider (ESP), as part 
of a concession agreement. Here the LA grants the ESP permission to ‘design and 
build, and...if possible, to finance, and then operate and maintain the scheme’ 
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(Interview 48), as one legal expert explained. It typically involves the LA transferring 
responsibility to the ESP to supply energy services (e.g. heat) to a body of 
consumers for which it has a legal responsibility to satisfy the energy needs of, such 
as council owned housing, libraries, leisure centres etc. In these situations the ESP 
may establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is a separate company 
specifically set up to oversee all aspects of the development of a specific energy 
system (e.g. CHP system and network) within a specific geographic location.  
Examples include Birmingham City Council’s concession agreement with Cofely 
District Energy8 , a subsidiary of a large French multi-national energy company 
Cofely GDF Suez, to deliver a district heat system on their behalf in Birmingham. In 
turn Cofely established Birmingham District Energy Company (BDEC) Ltd, an SPV 
responsible for the ‘design, build, finance, own and operate sustainable district 
energy schemes across Birmingham’ (DEKB, 2012). Cofely has established very 
similar schemes with Leicester, Coventry and Southampton city councils (Cofely, 
2014). 
Figure 3 outlines the main actor partnerships and resource flows in this type of LA 
ESCo arrangement.  
                                                     
8 Formerly known as Utilicom 
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Figure 3: Private sector owned concession agreement ESCo model (Hannon, 2012) 
5.2.2 Factors influencing LA decision to engage with this model 
LAs may contract with a private sector ESCo if it acknowledges the benefits of 
delivering a certain type of energy project within their local area but is unwilling to 
establish its own ESCo because it doesn’t want to absorb the associated risks or 
lacks the necessary technical expertise, financial resources and political will to do so 
(Interviews 4, 17, 20, 44 & 48). This was neatly summarised by one legal expert on 
ESCo contracts who explained that such an arrangement might arise if: ‘the public 
sector says ‘we don't really want do this but we want it to be done’ (Interviewee 48). 
The quid pro quo however is that the LA sacrifices some degree of control over the 
local energy system to another party (i.e. the ESP), compared with the LA ESCo 
approach (Interviews 2, 20 & 48). In the words of one legal expert, the LA may ‘no 
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longer necessarily be the master of its own destiny any more’ (Interviewee 48). This 
can have the effect of diminishing the LA’s ability to deliver on its long term political 
goals, particularly those associated with reducing fuel poverty. This is because as 
one economist explained that ‘if the ESCo is fundamentally there to give a rate of 
return to investors of 15%, it might only go for the very high value and dense 
customer base ones’ (Interview 41). Consequently, as a purely commercial entity 
the ESP will tend to prioritise projects that promise high returns, such as large scale, 
mix-use schemes with strong economies of scale and a balanced demand load, over 
smaller projects that may promise lower returns but with a stronger environmental 
and/or social welfare dimension. 
Extending the logic of the interviewees who underlined the value to the local area 
of recycling energy profits via a wholly owned LA ESCo (Interviews 2, 4, 7, 15, 40 & 
48), one key disadvantage of partnering with a private sector ESCo is that a 
significant proportion of the energy project revenue will not be captured by the LA. 
In some cases 100% of the profit generated might be channelled to the ESP but in 
others the LA will receive a proportion of the revenue. One senior low-carbon 
energy consultant explained that whilst: 
‘They are professionally established and they will understand the risks better 
but the disadvantage with that is that they take all the profit unless you can 
have some sharing arrangement’ (Interview 39) 
However, the LA can receive some proportion of the revenue through this 
arrangement, albeit typically a small proportion of the project’s profits. For 
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instance, in the case of Birmingham ‘the first 5% of BDEC’s profits are taken to pay 
Cofely’s costs, and subsequent profits are split 50:50 to Cofely, and to partnership 
board members in the form of an energy rebate’ (Hawkey et al., 2013 p.25), which 
includes Birmingham City Council.  
From the ESP’s perspective, there are obvious benefits to contracting with LAs on a 
concession basis. Firstly, concession agreements limit the number of ESCos 
operating in the local area, thus reducing the number of competitors to the ESP and 
in turn limiting the risk it is exposed to. Secondly, the LA can help to promote the 
ESP’s schemes in the area, as has been the case in Birmingham with Birmingham 
City Council and Cofely. Thirdly, LAs typically occupy large buildings in or close to 
city centres, which have high levels of energy demand. This means the ESP can 
usually capture better economies of scale in terms of servicing a large and dense 
energy load and by having to negotiate with multiple customers occupying smaller 
sites. This helps to reduce their transaction costs and make the energy service 
project more financially viable. Additionally, public sector organisations are also 
attractive to ESCos because they are financially backed by government; ‘the public 
sector never goes bust’ (Interview 47), as explained by one district heat expert. This 
provides the ESCo with confidence that the majority of its customers will be able to 
repay their debts on schedule, helping to reduce the cost of finance available to 
them as it provides investors with greater confidence that the ESP’s debts can be 
repaid.  
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In these cases LAs are often important ‘gatekeepers’ to opportunities in the local 
area, particularly in terms of town planning and so partnering closely with an LA is 
often a prerequisite for delivering local energy projects, as noted by one low-carbon 
consultant: 
‘Joint ventures are quite typical in things like district heating projects, 
where…it requires Local Authorities in most cases to unlock development 
opportunities, whether that's laying district heating pipes, planning policies, 
getting access to supplies’ (Interview 39) 
This helps to emphasise that even though an LA may not own and operate the 
assets directly, they still remain key enabling actors for this type of ESCo to succeed. 
Before discussing the third and final ESCo model, we summarise the key points 
made in this section in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Summary of key characteristics, benefits and limitations of the private sector owned concession 
agreement ESCo model from the LA’s perspective 
Characteristics 
Rationale for LA 
engagement 
Potential limitations  Examples 
• A large private sector 
ESCo, operating a ‘for-
profit’ financial model. 
• Concession agreement 
established between 
ESP and LA  
• SPV typically 
established to manage 
the project 
• Private ESCo assumes 
majority of the risk 
associated with 
delivering energy 
projects that can meet 
some of the LA’s 
political objectives 
• Provides any lacking 
expertise, experience 
or resources LA might 
be lacking to deliver 
energy projects 
• Sacrifice majority of 
control to private 
sector ESCo 
• Compromise between 
LA’s and private ESCo’s 
objectives 
• Private ESCo takes a 
significant share of the 
project revenue, which 
is typically redirected 
outside local area 
• Cofely GDF Suez – 
Southampton City 
Council 
• Veolia – Sheffield City 
Council 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
• Birmingham District 
Energy Company Ltd 
(Cofely GDF Suez 
owned) – Birmingham 
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 City Council 
• Barkantine Heat & 
Power Company (EDF 
owned) – Tower 
Hamlets Council 
• Southampton 
Geothermal Heating 
Company Limited 
(Cofely GDF Suez 
owned) – Southampton 
City Council 
5.3 Local Authorities and the community owned and operated ESCo model 
5.3.1 Overview of arrangement 
A community owned and operated ESCo is established by a group of individuals or a 
civil society organisation in order to deliver energy service projects that help to 
satisfy the energy needs of the local community, whilst also realising a set of wider 
objectives (e.g. self-sufficiency, alleviation of fuel poverty, local economic growth 
etc.). These ESCos can take a variety of legal forms, including community interest 
companies (CICs); industrial and provident societies; private companies limited by 
guarantee; unincorporated associations; trusts; and private companies limited by 
shares. They typically deliver very small-scale energy service projects given the 
specific focus on a small community area and the limited resources at its disposal. 
Examples include Meadowside Ozone Energy Services (MOZES) in Nottingham, 
Douglas Community EcoHeat, in South Lanarkshire, Woolhope Woodheat, in South 
Herefordshire, and Kielder Community Enterprises Ltd in Northumberland. 
Figure 4 outlines the basic structure of this model, illustrating how LAs can play an 
important role in providing the skills, resources and political support required for to 
establish and operate a community ESCo. In return the LA may receive financial 
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payment for these services, or more likely ‘payment in kind’ as the community ESCo 
serves to improve the well-being of the local community, which will be to the 
benefit of the LA. 
 
Figure 4: Community owned and run ESCo (Hannon, 2012) 
5.3.2 Factors influencing LA decision to engage with this model 
Many of the individuals interviewed in relation to this model stressed the 
community benefits of empowering local people to deliver energy projects at the 
local-level (Interviews 18, 34-37, 44, 47-48). As evidenced by the following quote 
from a CHP expert who works with community ESCos, the transfer of energy 
governance responsibilities to the community can be understood as a reaction from 
some people to centralised energy generation paradigm and the dominance of the 
‘Big Six’:  
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‘At the moment, energy is just something that is done to people but actually 
giving them control over the local generation, distribution and supply of 
electricity empowers that community’ (Interview 47) 
A community owned and run ESCo, by its very nature, is controlled by groups 
and/or civil society organisations and not the LA. This is unlikely to prove to be an 
issue considering that the political objectives of both the community and the LA are 
often closely aligned given their shared interest in improving the quality of life in 
the local area. However, alignment is not guaranteed and important differences 
may exist between their agendas leading to direct conflict between these two 
bodies’ governance efforts.  
This situation can be illustrated by the case of Meadows Ozone Energy Services 
Limited (MOZES), a community ESCo in Nottingham, which in 2009 installed 67 
roof-top photo-voltaic (PV) systems throughout the Meadows area, the vast 
majority of which were free of charge to residents. Whilst MOZES and Nottingham 
City Council have a history of working towards similar energy related objectives, 
most notably reducing carbon emissions, fuel poverty and self-sufficiency, they 
have shared a difficult relationship at times. The first issue, highlighted here by one 
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community ESCo committee member, was that the LA already had responsibilities 
to support its own LA ‘arm’s length’ ESCo, called Enviroenergy9:  
‘They were a bit sceptical about how far they could support [our project] 
because they were locked into this contract with Enviroenergy’ (Interview 
35) 
Therefore, the council’s political support was channelled mostly towards its own 
ESCo rather than MOZES. The other was that the LA had proposed a Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) project in the Meadows that would have involved the re-
development of a number council houses in the area. This created a significant 
obstacle to MOZES’ plan to roll-out PV systems across the community project, 
which was predicated on installing these on the existing housing stock. However, as 
time has passed the two bodies have recognised the significant overlap between 
their objectives and have made a concerted effort to work together towards shared 
objectives (Interviews 34 & 35). For instance, one of the LA’s Councillors now sits on 
MOZES’s board to provide advice on its current and future operations in a bid to 
help align the two organisations’ objectives. 
If there is a strong degree of alignment between the both the community ESCo’s 
and the LA’s political agendas then the LA may benefit by avoiding the need to 
                                                     
9 EnviroEnergy is an autonomous company wholly owned by Nottingham City 
Council that provides heat and power, sourced from burning municipal waste, to 
homes and businesses across Nottingham via a district heating system.  
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commit its own resources to deliver similar activities. Furthermore, project delivery 
through the community ESCo could prove more effective in the sense that they can 
help to involve citizens to help deliver energy projects, as explained by one 
community ESCo director ‘the enthusiasm of people and the strength of the 
community’ was an extremely valuable resource because it meant that ‘when you 
need to get numbers of people to do something, then you can get that done’ 
(Interview 33).  
From the community ESCo’s perspective, LA support can be critical given the limited 
resources often at their disposal, be it financial, technical or political. Financial 
support can help to provide the necessary resources to deliver these projects. For 
example, Kielder Community Enterprises Ltd in the north east of England received 
in excess of £30,000 to deliver its district heat scheme from Northumberland 
County Council given the benefits it would provide to both the local environment 
and economy (Northumberland National Park, 2014). This financial support can 
enable community ESCos to hire technical support and thus alleviate their ‘reliance 
on volunteers’ time’ (Interview 33), as explained by one Community ESCo Director. 
Political support is also essential, for example MOZES benefitted from the support 
of the local MP at the time, who gave the ESCo an important voice within key 
political circles and a number of important contacts that helped aid its 
development.  
Table 3 summarises the key points discussed in this sub-section.   
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Table 3: Summary of key characteristics, benefits and limitations of the community ESCo model from the LA’s 
perspective 
Characteristics Rationale for 
engagement 
Potential limitations  Examples 
• Community owned and 
run 
• Activities focused on a 
community area 
• Typically possess 
limited resources 
 
• LA and ESCo’s 
objectives likely to be 
well aligned given 
shared concerns about 
local community’s 
wellbeing 
• LA can avoid 
committing resources if 
projects are aligned 
with their own 
objectives 
• Community action can 
harness community 
activism 
• Community support 
can help to  avoid local 
opposition 
• LA has little control 
over ESCo’s actions 
• Objectives of LA and 
community ESCo not 
necessarily aligned 
• ESCo’s activities tend to 
be limited to the 
community area rather 
than the wider borough 
• Limited resources and 
typically very reliant on 
the support of key 
partners such as the LA 
• Meadowside Ozone 
Energy Services 
(MOZES) in Nottingham 
• Douglas Community 
EcoHeat, in South 
Lanarkshire 
• Woolhope Woodheat, 
in South Herefordshire 
• Kielder Community 
Enterprises Ltd, in 
Northumberland 
6 Policy and practical considerations associated with Local Authority 
engagement with ESCo model 
Based on the results of the empirical investigation (Section 5), this section considers 
some of the wider issues and policy implications from a LA perspective relating to 
engagement with the ESCo model. 
6.1 Trade-offs between Local Authority ESCo engagement approaches 
From the perspective of the LA, engaging with the ESCo model presents a means of 
influencing local energy system change that is concomitant with their political 
objectives. However, an important trade-off exists between the extent to which the 
LA exposes itself to the risks associated with delivering energy projects on the one 
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hand and how much control it is able to exert over local energy system 
developments on the other.  
If an LA is willing to accept the majority of the financial and operational risks 
associated with owning and operating its own ‘arm’s length’ ESCo then it will be 
rewarded with a significant degree of strategic control over local energy project 
developments and the revenue they generate, as in the cases of Woking and 
Aberdeen (Section 5.1). In contrast, whilst some LAs might appreciate the value of 
controlling such development, they are risk adverse and thus unwilling to expose 
themselves and their electorate to the risks associated with the project, such as 
poor performing assets, rising gas prices or unexpected reductions in energy 
demand. As an alternative these LAs may opt to transfer responsibility to a private 
sector ESCo via a concession agreement, as employed in Birmingham and 
Southampton for example (Section 5.2). Another option would be to endorse and 
actively support the activities of a community ESCo rather than establish their own, 
such as in Nottingham or Kielder (Section 5.3).  
Whilst contracting or collaborating with an existing ESCo can reduce the LA’s 
exposure to investment and operational risk compared to establishing its own, the 
trade-off is that the LA sacrifices much of the strategic control over the ESCo’s 
activities to another organisation. For instance, a private sector ESP will typically 
prioritise the most financially profitable energy projects, whilst a community ESCo 
will prioritise ‘public good’ objectives that are specific to their community rather 
than the wider population of the town or city they reside in. In both cases the LA 
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risks projects being delivered in its local area that are either not entirely in-keeping 
with their objectives, or worse, are in direct conflict with them. The concession 
agreement between the LA and the ESCo, as employed in Birmingham for example, 
seeks to guard against this by clearly stating the responsibilities of each of the 
partners and how they will benefit from the scheme as part of a contract. However, 
the arrangement is likely to be more informal between an LA and a community 
ESCo, and thus potentially more problematic. 
The LA’s decision to adopt one of these approaches over the others will largely 
depend on how it interprets and intends to respond to the energy ‘trilemma’. If for 
example long term social and environmental objectives, such as carbon reductions 
and reducing fuel poverty are prioritised as in Aberdeen and Woking, it is likely that 
the arm’s length model will be deemed optimal. This is because the LA can exert 
long term strategic control over the ESCo and deliver energy projects across the city 
that are driven not just on commercial terms but also ‘common good’ objectives. 
On the other hand if short term concerns around funding and catalysing economic 
development through private investment are the LA’s main priorities then the 
private sector concession model might be preferred or a partnership with a local 
community ESCo.  
6.2 Aligning national and local political agendas 
Whilst LA support can really bolster the business case for local-level ESCo activity, it 
is very much dependent on a supportive national regulatory framework (DECC, 
2013b; Hawkey et al., 2014). Although not the subject of this particular study, we 
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note that many of the interviewees expressed frustration at what they perceived to 
be a regulatory framework that offered relatively little support for decentralised 
energy (Interviews 3, 15, 17, 18, 20 - 21, 40, 47). This coupled with the uncertainty 
over the UK government’s commitment to the climate change agenda, and 
associated low carbon energy policies, was considered detrimental to growth in the 
UK LA ESCo market. This is because ESCos generally operate on the basis of long 
term contracts and thus swift, unexpected changes in their operating environment 
may have detrimental effects on their business case (Interviews 19, 20, 33 & 36). 
The business case for local-level ESCo activity is heavily dependent on the wider 
market and regulatory framework and low carbon policies put in place by central 
government. Legislative commitments such as long-term carbon reduction targets 
(e.g. Climate Change Act), and specific energy policies such as long-term financial 
incentives for low-carbon energy generation (e.g. Feed in Tariff, Renewable Heat 
Incentive), capital grant schemes (e.g. Low Carbon Communities Fund), and energy 
efficiency obligations (e.g. Energy Company Obligation) are normally critical to the 
successful operation of an ESCo providing energy supply contracts (Hannon, 2012; 
Hannon et al., 2013). Clearly uncertainty over the long term future and direction of 
these policies may undermine ESCo revenue streams in the future. 
One example of a national-local misalignment, which has previously been 
elaborated in Bolton and Foxon (2013), is how operators of smaller scale CHP plants 
often find the transaction costs associated with selling electricity into the national 
wholesale electricity market (called BETTA) to be inhibitive. One LA chief executive 
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explained that the current market structure is biased towards the need of large-
scale Energy Utility companies, arguing that: ‘the rules are written for them’ and 
that ‘the transaction and membership costs are inhibitive’ (Interview 17). Their 
colleague, a managing director of the LA’s ESCo, explained that to enter the 
electricity market to trade their electricity and that ‘it would cost us £500,000 
minimum to join that pool...far too much as a small supplier’ (Interview 4). This 
issue is not confined to the Woking case as a number of ESCos throughout the UK 
have invested in costly private wire networks that link an ESCos to customers 
demanding electricity. This is of course a costly capital intensive solution, but one 
which a number of ESCos judge to be more efficient in terms of revenue generation 
than transacting in the national markets.   
Other examples of poor alignment of national and local policies highlighted by the 
interviewees included the removal of carbon reporting obligations following recent 
changes to Local Authority National Indicators, as well as the lack of any 
government directive for the development of local low-carbon strategic plans 
(Sections 3.2 and 5.1.2). Despite this lack of impetus from central government, 
some LAs are already implementing low-carbon strategies, high profile examples 
include the Greater London Authority’s Climate Change Mitigation and Energy 
Strategy (GLA, 2011) and Woking Borough Council’s Climate Change Strategy (WBC, 
2012). However, these represent only a small number of leading councils and the 
lack of obligations and guidelines on how to develop and implement strategies 
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means that these promising developments are likely to remain the exception rather 
than the rule.  
Clearly there is a need for further research to explore ways to improve the multi-
level governance of energy in the UK. We point to an interesting proposal recently 
made by Bale et al. on the formation of a ‘Strategic Energy Body’ (SEB) at the 
municipal level (Bale et al., 2012). The SEB constitutes a forum for city-regional 
stakeholders to co-develop plans that take advantage of local renewable energy 
and carbon reduction opportunities in a coordinated fashion. As Figure 5 illustrates 
this body could also act as an umbrella institution for the LA’s own ESCo but could 
equally help to coordinate energy initiatives being delivered by other organisations, 
such as private sector ESCos and community groups. Such a body could therefore 
help to avoid situations as witnessed in Nottingham where the objectives of the 
LA’s own ESCo were not initially aligned with MOZES’s, a community ESCo, which 
led to some degree of political wrangling. Building upon a well-coordinated local 
energy agenda, the SEB could act as an important interface between the local and 
national energy stakeholders, such as LAs and central government. Further work is 
of course required to examine how such a proposal could be implemented in 
practice and the challenges and opportunities that this presents.  
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Figure 5: Proposed model for a city Strategic Energy Body (reproduced from Bale et al., 2012) 
7 Conclusions  
The overarching argument developed in the paper is that in the new context of a 
liberalised UK energy, and growing concerns around the ‘energy trilemma’, some 
LAs are entering the energy market via innovative business models in a bid to help 
them perform a more active energy governance role. This move stems from a 
desire amongst some LAs to shape local energy system developments in a way that 
enables them to deliver on their political ‘public good’ objectives, such as tackling 
fuel poverty or improving the local environment. Consequently, a variety of novel 
actor configurations between public, private and third sector organisations have 
started to emerge. This move towards multi-actor local governance systems is 
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nuanced from the pre-war tradition of municipal ownership of local energy 
infrastructure and all-together different from the highly centralised, market-led 
governance approach that prevails today in the UK. 
This paper examines LA engagement with the ESCo model and identifies three 
common ways in which LAs in the UK have engaged with it: 1) establishing its own 
‘arm’s length’ ESCo that is owned and operated by the LA; 2) entering into a 
concession agreement with an existing private sector ESCo to deliver local energy 
projects; and 3) partnering with a community ESCo that shares similar objectives to 
improve the well-being of the local community. All three approaches have their 
own merits and limitations from the perspective of both the LA and its respective 
partners. Broadly the decision for an LA to establish its own ESCo or enter a 
partnership with a private sector or community ESCo will ultimately depend on the 
LA’s willingness to expose itself to risk, the extent to which it wants to retain 
strategic control over local energy system change, the resources it has at its 
disposal and the extent to which it is committed to tackling the UK’s ‘energy 
trilemma’.  
A number of important policy and practical considerations for both local and 
national government in relation to LA ESCo engagement are highlighted by this 
research. The first is that should an LA opt against establishing its own ESCo, due to 
the associated financial, technical and political risks, and instead collaborate with a 
private sector or community ESCo, it should be prepared that it will wield less 
control over local energy system developments given that substantial governance 
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powers are transferred to these other stakeholders. Furthermore, this approach 
carries its own form of political risk because these stakeholders may deliver local 
energy projects that are not closely aligned with the LA’s own political objectives.  
The need for a stronger alignment between national and local energy policy 
agendas is underlined by this paper, to ensure that central government policy does 
not inhibit LAs from playing an active energy governance role. This is on the basis 
that whilst the executive powers of LAs play an important role in facilitating 
delivery of local energy projects, central government policy has a critical bearing on 
whether these materialise or not. One solution to this could be for LAs to establish 
an overarching Strategic Energy Body to offer a forum for the co-development and 
coordination of local energy plans between local actors, as well as an important 
interface between local and national energy stakeholders. The latter aspect could 
help LAs could communicate to central government the types of policies required to 
facilitate local energy initiatives. 
This paper presents a piece of qualitative, exploratory research that highlights some 
valuable insights into how and why LAs have engaged with the ESCo model to 
deliver local energy projects. To complement this work a more systematic, 
quantitative research study could be undertaken that critically examines: the 
strength of its business case, the potential size of the LA ESCo market, and finally, 
the relative contribution this governance approach could make to UK’s energy and 
climate change targets. 
45 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Ronan –  
Hannon would like to thank ESRC for funding through the Centre for Climate 
Change, Economics and Policy (CCCEP) (grant: RES-599-28-0001) for funding the 
final year of his PhD thesis. 
Bolton would like to thank the EPSRC and E.ON UK for funding under the 'Transition 
pathways to a low carbon economy' project: (grant: EP/F022832/1) and EPRSC for 
funding under the 'Realising Transition Pathways' consortium (grant: 
EP/K005316/1). The writing of this article was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral Prize 
awarded to the first author.  
The authors also wish to thank interviewees for participating in the study and the 
peer-reviewers for providing valuable feedback on the paper. Any errors and 
omissions should be attributed to the authors. 
Appendix A - list of interviews 
Table 4: List of interviewees 
Organisation Position Date Interviewer Code 
Local Authority 
‘arm’s length’ 
ESCo 
CEO July 2010 MH 1 
Managing director July 2010 RB 2 
Manager Aug 2011 MH 3 
Managing director Jan 2012 MH 4 
Local Authority 
Sustainability manager June 2010 RB 5 
Chief executive (also executive director of an LA ESCo) June 2010 RB 6 
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Head of environment unit July 2010 MH 7 
Sustainability/energy manager July 2010 RB 8 
Principal designer & energy engineer Aug 2010 RB 9 
Director of environmental services Aug 2010 RB 10 
Energy manager Aug 2010 RB 11 
Principal designer & energy engineer Aug 2010 MH 12 
Director of sustainable development Sept 2010 RB 13 
Head of sustainable development Sept 2010 RB 14 
Head of sustainable development Oct 2010 MH 15 
Head of decentralised energy delivery March 2011 RB 16 
Chief executive Jan 2012 MH 17 
Private sector 
energy supply 
contracting ESCo 
Sustainability project manager Sept 2010 MH 18 
Director Jan 2011 MH 19 
Emergent technology specialist July 2011 MH 20 
Director Aug 2011 MH 21 
Knowledge transfer partnership associate Jan 2012 MH 22 
Private sector 
energy supply 
contracting ESCo 
(Energy Utility 
owned or division 
of an Energy 
Utility) 
Services manager June 2010 RB 23 
Head of Community Energy Oct 2010 MH 24 
Head of community energy March 2011 RB 25 
Director of community energy Sept 2011 MH 26 
Product development and energy services manager Sept 2011 MH 27 
Business development director of community energy Sept 2011 MH 28 
Business development director of community energy Jan 2012 MH 29 
Head of energy solutions Jan 2012 MH 30 
Business development manager of community energy Jan 2012 MH 31 
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Senior business manager commercial energy division Jan 2012 MH 32 
Community owned 
and run ESCos 
Committee member July 2011 MH 33 
Committee member Aug 2011 MH 34 
Committee member Feb 2012 MH 35 
Committee member Feb 2012 MH 36 
Accountant Feb 2012 MH 37 
Consultancy or 
‘think tank’ 
Consultant (low carbon and local energy systems) July 2010 RB 38 
Associate Director (low-carbon) Jan 2011 MH 39 
Partner (low-carbon agriculture) July 2011 MH 40 
Chief economist and Head of Fair markets (consumers) Oct 2011 MH 41 
Government 
department 
Deputy Head of community-led policy making (energy) Aug 2010 RB 42 
Head of new business and economics (housing) June 2010 RB 43 
Policy Advisor (energy) Aug 2011 MH 44 
Trade association 
Deputy Director (interest in district energy) Dec 2010 RB 45 
Senior policy officer (interest in local government) August 2010 RB 46 
Associate (interest in district energy) July 2011 MH 47 
Law firm 
Partner July 2011 MH 48 
Partner Aug 2011 MH 49 
Investment firm 
Head of New Energy and Power Research Sept 2010 MH 50 
Director of Sustainable Energy Finance July 2011 MH 51 
University Senior Research Fellow - University Sept 2010 MH 52 
Regional 
Development 
Agency 
Head of Environment & Project Leader of Energy Services 
Procurement Framework 
Aug 2011 MH 53 
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